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Abstract. Recent innovations in mobile technologies are playing an important 
and vital role in combating the COVID-19 pandemic. While mobile apps’ 
functionality plays a crucial role in tackling the COVID-19 spread, it is also 
raising concerns about the associated privacy risks that users may face. Recent 
research studies have showed various technological measures on mobile 
applications that lack consideration of privacy risks in their data practices. For 
example, security vulnerabilities in COVID-19 apps can be exploited and 
therefore also pose privacy violations. In this paper, we focus on recent and newly 
developed COVID-19 apps and consider their threat landscape. Our objective was 
to identify security vulnerabilities that can lead to user-level privacy risks. We 
also formalize our approach by measuring the level of risk associated with assets 
and services that attackers may be targeting to capture during the exploitation. 
We utilized baseline risk assessment criteria within the scope of three specific 
security vulnerabilities that often exists in COVID-19 applications namely 
credential leaks, insecure communication, and HTTP request libraries. We 
present a proof of concept implementation for risk assessment of COVID-19 apps 
that can be utilized to evaluate privacy risk by the impact of assets and threat 
likelihood.  
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1 Introduction  
In the wave of the recent COVID-19 pandemic, mobile apps have been considered as 
an important technological medium in combatting the spread of the virus. While 
information sharing is a key component for the functionality of COVID-19 mobile apps, 
it is not clear if basic security and privacy protections are being put in place in these 
apps while we are rushing to deploy them around the world. For example, a recent 
research study found that the use of Google’s Firebase Analytics service by OpenTrace 
(which is a version of related close-source app TraceTogether) has potential scopes of 
privacy risks around (IP-based) location track as well as storage of user phone numbers 
in the Firebase authentication services [1]. Since one of Google’s primary business is 
advertising, this type of user data collection creates a potential conflict of interest [1]. 
Likewise, there exists inherited denial of service vulnerabilities in COVIDSafe version 
1.0 and 1.1 from OpenTrace code which allows an attacker within Bluetooth range to 
crash the application, potentially can cause harm to user’s device [2]. Furthermore, 
smartphones’ heterogeneous nature of having various sensor data, communication logs, 
and mobility of user device throughout a day, involve connections to various networks 
that are often not secure. Therefore, sensitive data can be transferred from client 
applications across unsecured channels and lead user’s information to possible 
exploitation. In addition, there are studies that show that some android users are not 
using HTTPS and therefore making users vulnerable to man in the middle attacks [3] 
and other privacy risks. In this context, users’ personal information on such apps can 
make organizations economically attractive source to attackers [3]. Hence, traditional 
risks may reappear with increased impact through COVID-19 apps. Attackers can pose 
security challenges that includes widened attack vectors through location surveillance 
in COVID-19 applications. Such threats can make traditional countermeasures 
ineffective and take away users’ trust from technology [4], [25].   
  
For COVID-19 applications, user trust in technology is one of the important factors to 
consider. In contact tracing apps, proximity tracing process is supported by a backend 
server that distributes anonymous exposure information where the server is trusted not 
to add fake exposure events and remove real exposure events [5]. In this case, the 
backend server is expected to act solely as a communication platform rather than 
processing and it is assumed to have users’ privacy intact even if the server is 
compromised. For the purpose of this study, we illustrate privacy risks through a 
scenario in which several security vulnerabilities could directly put the user’s data at 
risk within the context of a COVID-19 contact tracing application. Our aim for this 
illustration is to demonstrate how seemingly minor vulnerabilities can lead to very 
undesirable results. While these attacks are not novel, they help illustrate how existing 
mobile environments can facilitate some very basic attacks that can violate privacy 
protections. To begin this illustration, we examine exposed API keys and how an 
attacker could obtain the keys by manually inspect the decompiled code. After 
obtaining keys, network traffic could be observed for requests to be made, and to find 
the target within the API. This attack can then be taken in multiple directions, but we 
will assume that in the general case, the API has the ability to submit user information.  
Keys could then be used to submit a large number of new fraudulent user accounts. This 
could act as a denial of service attack if the volume of requests and methodology is 
correct. It could also open the door to further attacks on the infrastructure by attempting 
to simulate a large number of locations, such that if one of the fake accounts could be 
marked as positive for COVID-19, it could lead to many legitimate users believing they 
have encountered someone that tested positive for COVID-19, when in fact they did 
not. This attack largely leads to the availability and integrity of the application to be put 
under strain. There may also be capabilities of the API if it was not designed well in 
which user information could be extracted with only a key, leading to a large, but 
preventable data breach.  
Next, we examined insecure communication. There are many well-known issues with 
HTTP traffic. For example, it can be read by anyone that observed the request in transit.  
The use of HTTP enables a person-in-the middle scenario in which the attacker would 
be able to extract all information coming into the server, because HTTP isn’t encrypted. 
This allows a large amount of sensitive data to be leaked. Finally, the nature of HTTP 
libraries doesn’t inherently make them an attack vector, but having multiple HTTP 
libraries increases the attack surface by giving more places in which a vulnerability 
could be found and exploited. So, if our illustrative application had multiple HTTP 
libraries within it, then as an attacker, there are more libraries to look for possible 
exploitation or possibly use an already known exploit if it were not patched within the 
application. As an example, there might be some exploit within one library that allows 
for a person-in-the-middle attack that could intercept and decrypt HTTPS traffic, which 




Fig. 1. Possible attack paths when security smells are present. 
   
In COVID-19 application scenario, these exploitations and leakage of a user's 
information can also help build a social graph of people with which they had contact 
since in the system both identifiers and COVID-exposure are computed centrally and 
therefore, the backend server can associate uploaded ephemeral broadcast identifiers to 
permanent pseudo-identifiers for individual devices. Thus, the backend server can not 
only reconstruct a social graph, but it can reconstruct an interaction graph. COVID-19 
apps and associated security threats can potentially create privacy risk. If data is 
manipulated or stolen due to insecure communication, then this technology will not be 
trustworthy to users which is a risk of authentication at user level. At the same time, if 
these apps are not working properly and not performing correct exposure notification, 
there can raise the issue of integrity of this application while credential leaks lead to a 
potential risk of confidentiality. Keeping previous and current security exploitation in 
mind and associated privacy risks, our study approach is to assess COVID-19 apps from 
different security parameters to identify security vulnerabilities in credential leaks, 
HTTP request libraries, and insecure communications. For this study, our motivation is 
to map these chosen security exploitations and develop assessment strategies for 
associated privacy risk, as well as provide suggestions for how these vulnerabilities can 
be addressed in the development process.   
We demonstrated step by step how security vulnerabilities can be assessed and 
measured so that they can be quantified as risk factors. Then, we provided a risk 
assessment methodology that can be utilized when assessing privacy risk in mobile 
apps. While there are still a lack of formal risk assessment methods for determining 
risks at an individual level, we utilized a targeted risk assessment method to assess 
userspecific assets and threats that is focused on COVID-19 applications. We believe 
our study contributes towards the development of equations which considers users’ 
assets and threats associated with the COVID-19 apps, as well as the likelihood of risk. 
Therefore, our research questions are:  
  
RQ1: What are the possible privacy risks and security vulnerabilities that are specific 
to COVID-19 applications?   
  
RQ2: How can we measure or quantify risk based on prior knowledge/likelihood of 
threats that considers recent privacy risk associated with those applications?  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides relevant 
background information. Section 3 describes our research methodology. We present 
our app analysis results and possible resolutions in Section 4. Section 5 presents App’s 
Risk Assessment Strategy and then we conclude the paper with section 6 and 7  which 
provides a discussion of the implications, limitation, and future research directions as 
well as our conclusions.  
2 Background  
Several previous studies have shown the prevalence of smartphone privacy concerns 
and security threats around android permissions that can take place via privilege 
escalation attack that allows a malicious application to gain more capabilities leaked 
from a benign application [6], web API where message passing is also a medium of 
attack surface while providing availing inter-application collaboration. Adversarial can 
sniff, modify, steal or replace content with compromising user privacy [7], [19]. Again, 
malicious application can inject malicious messages/code which can lead to users’ data 
breaches. Furthermore, there are security concerns around ready-to-use code without 
proper caution such as [8], poor authentication and authorization, and lack of proper 
encryption of sensitive data [9] which keeps exposing users' data to malicious actors.    
These attack scenarios are not novel to COVID-19 apps. The urgency in testing basic 
security and privacy vulnerabilities within these apps are ever more vital because all 
types of organizations and governments around the world are rapidly working on 
developing and deploying contact tracing apps to track and mitigate the spread of 
COVID-19. While the developments of these apps are extremely important amid the 
COVID-19 pandemic, security and privacy researchers must address these basic 
anticipated vulnerabilities and the risks they may pose to users’ personal information. 
One such research study analyzed Singapore’s OpenTrace app and its use of Google 
firebase services to manage user data and deployment of reversible encryption and 
found that such method can be vulnerable to secret key disclosure [1]. Other researchers 
are proposing different security and privacy aware frameworks that are better at 
anticipating associated risk and adversarial attacks. Some of the proposed or 
implemented designs include decentralized proximity tracing [5]; construction of token 
in Bluetooth contact tracing [10]; distributed hash table to build a decentralized 
messaging system for infected users [11]; minimizing re identification risk strategy 
[12], user-centric privacy design [24] to ensure privacy is well preserved with formal 
security model mechanisms.   
Generally, organizations and IT sectors implement security standards and controls, as 
well as risk assessments, to decrease the likelihood of risk for their assets and services 
from the evolving landscape of exploitation [11]. Qualitative and quantitative research 
has been done regarding decision making on security measures implementation based 
on the estimation of attack paths and security costs by attack graphs, tress, and other 
models [2], [13]. Our approach of assessing various assets and their associated risks as 
it pertains to COVID-19 apps where we consider users’ personal information as an asset 
is valuable and unique. Previous research has identified different types of assets like 
personal data, financial assets, and personal and political reputation based on the 
privacy risks [14]. With these prior studies as our motivation, we have designed our 
experiment considering three security vulnerabilities in COVID-19 apps to assess risks 
and articulate assessment strategies for investigated vulnerabilities based on user level 
asset and threat likelihood.  
3 Method  
Following previous research papers’ approach in examining privacy violations, we 
focused our study on specific threats, namely sensitive data exposure, broken 
authentication, and security misconfiguration. While there are many other security 
threats that can be evaluated, we believe these three make up the most common security 
issues and it is supported by previous studies [17], [2], [20]. Therefore, in terms of 
COVID-19 apps, we focus on Credential leaks as one of the security exploitations since 
it involves sensitive data including financial, healthcare, and PII to be compromised if 
there are not enough security measures, such as encryption for the different keys and 
data storage. Next, we considered insecure communication and HTTP request libraries 
which can lead to insecure default configurations, incomplete or ad-hoc configurations, 
misconfigured HTTP headers, and verbose error messages containing sensitive 
information. Therefore, we believe these three specific security vulnerabilities selected 
in our assessment of COVID-19 apps constitutes the most common vulnerabilities [2], 
[17], [21] that can be encountered in those apps. Thus, guarding against these 
vulnerabilities can ensure timely and secure configuration of COVID-19 apps.   
  
App selection: We selected 7 apps from the recent CVE report on apps having frequent 
exploitation report [2]. Initially, we assessed apps by automated frameworks for 
understanding fundamental security requirements. This step is not necessarily a part of 
this study, but rather was used as our preliminary step towards our initial understanding 
of those apps. Our goal is to examine security vulnerabilities in terms of privacy 
violation.   
Selecting security parameters to check: After having our initial inspection, we 
emphasize on credential leaks; HTTP Request Libraries and insecure communication 
based on security exploitations [15] [16] that have been identified by previous studies. 
In addition, our review of the national security vulnerabilities database [2] suggest that 
when evaluating security vulnerabilities, we are to place an increased priority on 
patching the most commonly known vulnerabilities and controls to avoid risks. The 
purpose of this database is to provide security professionals with an update on the most 
common and exploited security issues so that they can prioritize patching and place 
security accordingly. As outlined below, we evaluated each selected COVID-19 app for 
the presence of the three specific vulnerabilities. Next, we recorded how frequently 
these vulnerabilities occurred in our selected apps. In addition, we recorded potential 
user privacy violations that might take place from such vulnerabilities. More 
specifically, we performed the following steps:  
• We selected 7 COVID-19 apps as described above to examine.   
• We examined each of the 7 apps for the presences of three types of security 
vulnerabilities (credential leaks, insecure communication and HTTP request 
libraries).  
• If the app had any of the 3 security vulnerabilities, then we analyzed/recorded 
how frequently those vulnerabilities occurred. For example, an app can have 
3 credential leaks such as API key, password, and username leaks.   
• We also investigated how these 3 security vulnerabilities can lead to privacy 
violations.   
  
Mapping Risk Assessment Strategy for COVID-19 apps: After analyzing each of the 
7 apps for security vulnerabilities as described above, we mapped associated privacy 
risks for users in respect to assets and services provided by those apps. To conduct this 
risk assessment, we measured the severity of privacy/security risk based on previous 
literature [18]. It is important to note that our measurement was not entirely based on 
performing quantitative evaluations but rather building and proposing an exploratory 
strategy to assess risk that can be tested/verified in future studies. More specifically, the 
following steps were performed for this mapping.  
  
• Our risk strategy considered 3 security vulnerabilities and a list of associated 
risks that can impact user’s and industries’ assets.  Assets include personal 
information, health information, location information, financial information 
that can impact availability, confidentiality, and integrity in any security 
infrastructure. For this study, we assessed impact on assets that would be 
compromised by these selected 3 security vulnerabilities.  
• Then we considered the likelihood of privacy risks associated with those assets 
listed above. We adopted the Likelihood metrics from previous literature that 
included measures of a) historical risk data, (b) statistics of the known 
vulnerabilities, and (c) existing controls to reduce vulnerabilities. For 
example, in our study, credential leaks are considered a vulnerability. In this 
case, threat likelihood is calculated on the basis of, a) the likelihood of 
credential leaks in the COVID-19 smartphone platform, b) the threat incident 
likelihood from previous incidents, i.e. statistics on threat incidents in the 
platform or previous incidents experienced by the user, and c) the relevant 
security control existence/absence.    
• Therefore, we propose to calculate risk by the combination of impact on user 
privacy and likelihood of vulnerabilities. We followed this method in our risk 
calculation that has been proposed in previous risk assessment studies [13,14].   
4 Result & Possible Solutions  
In this section, we reported our conducted analysis specifically for three security 
exploits for 7 apps. Three focus areas for security measurements are credential leaks, 
insecure communication, and HTTP request libraries.  
  
4.1 Credential Leaks  
 The development of mobile applications often hinges upon using web applications and 
services through the application’s programming interface, also known as an API, in 
order to serve dynamic content, collect data, or perform other complex operations that 
may not be otherwise appropriate or possible on users’ devices through HTTP or 
HTTPS requests. Most APIs use keys for authentication within the headers of the 
requests. The consequences of keys being wrongfully obtained might mean private 
information is leaked, or financial repercussions based on billing agreements for the 
API which also fits under a broader topic of credential leaks where credentials are 
revealed to unauthorized entities through unintended channels. This could include 
emails, passwords, or tokens, among other sensitive information that might be used for 
authentication purposes. The primary focus of this assessment was to find types of 
credentials like API keys.    
One email was found but it seemed to be a remnant of code that was meant for testing 
an upload of data. Within the apps examined, there were multiple instances in which 
API keys were hardcoded and easily accessible by decompiling the application, as was 
done within the study. This practice is often considered insecure partially due to the 
possibility of wrongfully obtaining keys. Inspection of these applications was done 
manually; only the code that would have been written by the developers was inspected. 
This not only made the manual inspection more feasible, but also allowed us to assess 
the extent of the credential leaks that the developers would have been directly 
responsible for. Due to the variance in length, possible characters, and forms that API 
keys may take, we searched for terms that would possibly appear near these credentials 
(terms like key, token, etc.) and inspected the files in which matches showed up. Results 
were counted if they were directly labeled as a key or token, which may not fully 
account for every single key hardcoded based on naming scheme or associated labels. 
Notably, the parameters for which we counted keys or tokens omitted pieces of data 
that may be labeled as “ids”. There are some cases in which a value labeled ID would 
be equivalent to a key, and those scenarios would be excluded from this analysis.      
  
Most of the API keys found in each case were found in the 
resources/res/values/string.xml file after decompiling as can be seen in an excerpt from 




Fig. 2. Example snippet of credential leak within CoronaSUS 
  
Results in Table 1 denoted with a * were situations in which two of the leaked 
credentials were related to Google libraries, and had security features available to 
mitigate or prevent potential unauthorized use. These two credentials were uniformly 
named across the apps that they occurred in and were labeled google api key and google 
crash reporting api key. If we omit these findings, then we are left with three 
applications that had credentials leaked, Aarogya Setu, COVIDSafe, and האפליקציה .   
 
Table 1. Leaked Credentials Total Breakdown by Application  
 
Security Smell: 1 
Application Instances of leaked credentials 






היצקילפאה  3* 
  
 Privacy Risks With consideration of these occurrences not being disclosed to 
developers, discussion of further leaked credentials is discussed in aggregate. 4 keys 
found could be classified broadly as an application API key and 2 keys related to 3rd 
party services that handle application engagement and location management. Notably, 
the key that directly relates to the API could have direct consequences to the privacy of 
other users if data can be exfiltrated from the server through different endpoints. 
Inversely, it could also act as a way to deny service to users if an excess of requests is 
made. These two consequences are on opposite sides of the spectrum of things that can 
be done with keys in related circumstances. Oftentimes attacks are dependent 
implementations of the server, along with the possible utilities that the API provides. 
These attacks are also dependent on proper permissions and control of the API key not 
being implemented. Further, with the location service, there may be a risk that a 
malicious actor is able to gather user locations in the event where API is not designed 
well, or could possibly flood the API with excess data, which would be problematic for 
offering intended service of the mobile application it is used in. API implementations 
that are unsecured and don’t have proper access control implementations in place, such 
as a restriction on requesting IP addresses can be subject to serious attacks if the proper 
care is taken with the key that is used, especially in a time in which decompiling an app 
is a readily available service with relatively low barrier to use.  
  
 Proposed resolution: In terms of solving the specific problem of leaving API keys 
hardcoded within applications is to make it more difficult to obtain such keys or key 
could not be obtained solely through decompiling the application. This can mean that 
if an adversary wanted to obtain the key, they might have to use methodologies for 
examining the memory of the application or other debugging tools. Alternatively, 
employing methodologies similar to what was seen with Google libraries in which key 
owners have the ability to strictly limit when and where the keys can be used, but this 
may open up other possible attacks.  
  
4.2 Insecure Communication  
With many mobile applications relying on web services in order to provide services, it 
is very important for the communication channels in which this information is conveyed 
to be secure. The predominant method for this communication is HTTP and HTTPS. 
HTTP is transmitted through plaintext methods, whereas HTTPS is transmitted through 
encrypted methods. The consequence of not using HTTPS is that it severely endangers 
the privacy for the user of the application of data being stolen or manipulated.  
 Within our analysis of URLs that were hardcoded into the applications, we only 
examined domains that would have been directly coded by developers of the app. URLs 
within 3rd party libraries or URLs included as part of the Android application build 
process were omitted. Notably, this excludes URLs from the schemas.android.com 
subdomain, as this is used to host base resources for most Android applications. These 
include domains such as apache.org. URLS that were hard-coded but did not contain 
the prefix of http or https were counted under undetermined as it would likely be 
determinant on the HTTP library used to make the request or how the string is later 
manipulated in code. The counts below are the number of unique URLs to avoid double 
counting if a URL is hardcoded in more than one place [22].  
Table 2. Breakdown of URLs found through Manual Inspection  
 
Application 
Security Smell: 2 
#HTTP #HTTPS Undetermined 
Aarogya Setu 0 5 2 
ABTraceTogether 0 5 0 
CoronaSUS 1 5 2 
COVIDSafe 0 5 1 
Protego 0 7 2 
TraceTogether 0 5 2 
היצקילפאה  0 78 2 
  
 Since the hardcoded URLs were inspected manually, it wasn’t feasible at this time to 
find the exact purpose and behavior of each link through the code. However, insight to 
the URL’s purpose can be found from its name and general form. The http: 
http://mobileapps.saude.gov.br/coronavirus and following the link in a browser only 
returns text in JSON format, which might indicate this is an API URL, though it is not 
clear what information might be served with requests to this URL, but if it is sensitive 
information, then it is a threat to user privacy as discussed earlier. Within links that 
were HTTPS, they could be grouped into two main descriptions. They were either 
linked to external websites or resources, such as FAQs, privacy agreements, or EULAs, 
or the URLs were used for API requests. The former is the driving reason for 
“ האפליקציה ” to have had 78 hardcoded HTTPS links. Collectively, there was one definite 
case in which this code smell was present, while the undetermined URLS might be 
potential cases.   
Proposed Resolution: Unfortunately, there aren’t as many flexible fixes to this 
problem as there are with the API keys. One possible solution is to ensure that HTTP 
Request libraries used in your application (also discussed in the next section) are 
capable of making HTTPS requests, and that this functionality is used. The use of 
HTTPS is all dependent on the server being communicated with having the capability 
as well. So, in the event that developers are using an API they built and are hosting, 
they should take the time to ensure that they have properly set up HTTPS capabilities 
on their server to attempt to protect the inbound and outbound communications.   
  
4.3 HTTP Request Libraries  
It is common practice to use 3rd party libraries within software development to facilitate 
and simplify the development cycle. This can certainly prove to be efficient and 
effective for completing development, it can introduce other concerns in regard to 
potential credit leaks and cohesiveness of the application. While the implications of this 
security vulnerability may not be as significant as others, it is still worth considering in 
its relation to the other two security vulnerabilities.  
The use of multiple HTTP libraries in each application can also increase the potential 
attack surface of the app, as it presents opportunities for more vulnerabilities to arise. 
This can pose a security threat to the application’s infrastructure while also posing a 
threat to the users of the application. It is worth noting that the consequences of an 
attack on an HTTP library would be potentially reliant upon which URLs the HTTP 
library serves. The libraries used were determined by manual inspection of the 3rd party 
libraries that were included within each application. If the library was self-described 
within official documentation or webpages as a library for making generic HTTP or 
API related requests, then it was included within the survey of libraries below. 3rd party 
services that offered a library specifically for their own owned service were not 
included as these libraries are often specialized and provide other services. Libraries 
were surveyed based on the inclusion of library folders in the decompiled application.  
 In some cases, the libraries could not be fully assessed due to code obfuscation. Two 
applications, TraceTogether and האפליקציה , have some obfuscation and files were not 
named in conventional naming conventions and had names of the form similar to 
C0000a.java, where the number could be a four-digit number and the last letter could 
be any letter of the alphabet. Some of the consequences of our assessment could be due 
to the compiler that we used. Results were gathered from the folders whose naming 
structure remained intact. The distribution of HTTP libraries is dominated by 
OKHTTP3 and has some other inclusions. As discussed earlier, there is some risk with 
using multiple libraries, and it seems that this selection of apps abides by this. The use 
of libraries that are written for a specific product in mind can be advantageous in that it 
should ideally take the burden of security considerations from the developers and places 
them onto the companies that have a better working knowledge of their product, and 
assumedly have more incentive, time, and resources to devote to such considerations 
compared to the developers using their library. Using HTTP libraries that are meant to 
flexibly handle different HTTP requests can place this burden back on the developers 
as it may not directly promote good practices for the purposes of API requests or other 
services that require key authentication.  
  
5 App’s Privacy Risk Assessment Strategy  
In this study of COVID-19 app assessment, we have demonstrated associated risks for 
users’ privacy. In this section, we specify our proposed risk assessment strategy for 
COVID-19 smartphone apps that is described in section 4.  Our risk assessment strategy 
considers associated risks that can impact users’/industries’ assets and the likelihood of 
those risks. We have found that our selected security vulnerabilities can lead to personal 
information leaks, data sharing/storage risks, and insecure communication between 
server and client application. Therefore, in our risk assessment strategy, we considered 
credential leaks, HTTP libraries, and insecure communication as attack vectors to do 
our analysis. The frequency of those attacks and the associated impact on users’ privacy 
due to those vulnerabilities while using COVID-19 apps are shown in the results 
section. While our risk assessment strategy is somewhat exploratory, we believe that 
our proposed approach for evaluating COVID-19 apps is robust, as it not only considers 
the current privacy impact, but also includes statistics from past exploitations.   
  
To assess COVID-19 smartphone apps’ privacy risk, our first criteria was to evaluate 
its assets. Assets identified were related to COVID-19 apps’ components, for example, 
personal information, health information, location information, financial information. 
Based on that, impact of such insecurity scenarios (loss of availability, confidentiality 
and integrity) can be assessed. For instance, the impact of data type is inferred to their 
associated data sources. This means that if there are ‘personal’ data types that those 
apps are dealing with, then the disclosure impact for the data source are: “exposure 
notification”, “data Processing” and “Data storage/sharing” can be calculated, as 
follows:   
  
Impact (Data Sharing) = max {Impact (personal data), Impact (health data)} 
I = # avg(I!", I#")
$
%&'   
 
Where each vulnerability here, such as, credential leaks, insecure communication and 
HTTP request library will be present and considered as a single vulnerability vector: 
 
𝑉( = {0,1}		𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑎𝑙𝑙	𝑖	, 𝑖 = 1,2,3,4, … , 𝑛 
 
So, the overall COVID-19 smartphone apps’ data sharing impact is the max impact 
related to personal data and health data. Some other attacks can happen to other types 
of assets, i.e., the device, data, applications, and connectivity.  
 
  The other variable that can be measured is threat likelihood for risk assessment that is 
assessed on the basis of: (a) experience and applicable statistics, (b) vulnerabilities, and 
(c) existing controls to reduce vulnerabilities. Each threat, for example, credential leaks 
is grouped in the appropriate attack vector dimension. Asset refers to the topics targeted 
by the threat. For example, Credential leaks are considered as the threat. In this case, 
threat likelihood is valuated on the basis of a) the likelihood of credential leaks in the 
COVID-19 smartphone platform, b) the threat incident likelihood from previous 
incidents, i.e.statistics on threat incidents in the platform or previous incidents 
experienced by the user, and c) the relevant security control existence (for mobile apps 
data management and security). Incident Information from the organization's historical 
database recorded in system log files can be used in modeling which can predict threats 
likelihood. In this case, existing model, such as, attack graph can be used for new 
incoming threats.   
 
𝑇) = {0,1}		𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑎𝑙𝑙	𝑗, 𝑗 = 1,2,3,4, … ,𝑚 
 
    Where each threat here, like users’ information leaks, data stolen/manipulations are 
considered as threat vector. where 𝑇) represents an individual threat. Value 1 indicates 
the presence of this threat in the information systems and otherwise 0. So, within 
vulnerability and threat to individual level, likelihood of incoming threats can be 
measured by 𝐿)( =	 (	𝑇) , 𝑉() where threat acting over a vulnerability [14]. 
 
Combining the impact assessment of assets/services and threat likelihood can be used 
to derive the risk for a particular security vulnerability in COVID-19 applications. 
Therefore, we can assess risk based on the current attack landscape and previous attack 
history assuming there exists controls against those threats. 𝐶* = {0,1}	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑎𝑙𝑙	𝑘, 𝑘 =
1,2,3, … , 𝑝 








6 Discussion   
The advancement of ICTs and its critical role in society in recent times requires us to 
develop timely and robust test methods, reference data, proof of concept 
implementations, and technical analyses. The use of COVID-19 apps throughout the 
world as one mechanism to combat the pandemic demonstrates the urgent need for 
better data privacy/security management that accounts for not only known privacy risks 
but also for unintended privacy risk for both users and organizations. While COVID19 
apps provide a timely vehicle for tackling the spread of the virus, it also provides a 
unique and global scenario for users’ loss of privacy.  Mobile platforms continue to be 
one of the main sources of personal information exchange and storage and therefore 
more vulnerable to un/expected attacks that can violate users’ privacy [15]. To be able 
to protect against these risks, a risk assessment strategy is crucial. In our study, we 
propose a risk assessment strategy for COVID-19 apps based on our COVID-19 app 
assessment. Our assessment strategy includes the impact on users’ privacy and the 
likelihood of those specific privacy vulnerabilities.   
  
While the proposed assessment strategy is exploratory, we believe that our strategy is 
the initial and essential step towards building a more comprehensive privacy/security 
assessment framework for mobile applications. We hope to improve this strategy in 
subsequent iterations by assessing more mobile apps and validating our approach in 
order to develop better methods for evaluating and managing privacy risks.   
  
Additionally, the complexities and innovative features of the mobile platforms will 
continue to introduce privacy and security risks that will need to be assessed quickly, 
cost-effectively, and easily, in order to reduce cyber risks. Therefore, including risk 
assessments as one part of the system evaluation process can be an effective approach 
that can facilitate decision making at all risk assessment hierarchy including 
organizational levels, mission/business process level, and information system level [5]. 
Furthermore, this type of risk assessment can be made part of the system development 
life cycle that involves pre-system acquisition and post system acquisition. Perhaps our 
proposed strategy can be utilized by software developers in their Software Development 
Life Cycle (SDLC) to make decision on the proper privacy requirements based on the 
impact and likelihood score of the vulnerabilities.   
  
As mentioned above, risk assessment strategy is an iterative development processes and 
it changes overtime with new threat landscape. Our proposed model provides the 
flexibility to add new security attack vectors and the associated privacy risk by the 
impact and likelihood variable. These two risk assessment variables consider both 
system risk and users’ risk. Further research is needed to verify this initial proposed 
strategy and to validate our proof of concept framework.   
 
While there are various studies related to COVID-19 apps’ privacy and security, our 
study provides a new approach towards assessment of risk which is not present in the 
current literature of COVID-19 apps. Our proof of concept approach can be used on 
Covid19 mobile applications to assess privacy risks  that maybe easily overlooked. 
While we believe our approach is a critical step forward, it is important to note that our 
security assessment considered only 3 main types of security vulnerabilities which does 
pose a limitation. However, in future studies additional vulnerabilities can be added to 
the list to broaden the scope and the privacy risks. Another limitation of this study is 
that our initial analysis considered only 6 COVID-19 mobile apps and therefore in order 
to confirm these findings and extend the scope of our findings additional Covid-19 apps 
needs to be considered and analyzed.   
 
For our future research, we will be examining a larger and diverse set of COVID-19 
apps for security vulnerabilities to conduct our experiment. In addition, we will be 
utilizing our risk strategy on a publicly available risk incident data set in order to expand 
and focus our strategy. 
 
7 Conclusion  
Protecting user’s privacy and security against adversaries and unauthorized access 
continues to be a challenging task in the age of technological innovation. Mobile 
devices and applications make this task even more difficult due to its nature of constant 
information sharing that includes a wide range of user’s personal information. In our 
paper, we demonstrate specific security vulnerabilities relate to COVID-19 apps and 
provide proof of concept strategy that can be utilized for privacy and security risk 
assessment. We believe that our proposed risk assessment strategy can be expanded and 
developed further into a framework that can provide an efficient and novel approach 
for assessing  security and privacy risks in mobile application. In our future work, we 
plan to develop this risk assessment framework further by including more training and 
testing data from public database. 
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